A Framework for Analysis of the Takings Issue by Favre, David S.
Michigan State University College of Law
Digital Commons at Michigan State University College of Law
Faculty Publications
1-1-1995
A Framework for Analysis of the Takings Issue
David S. Favre
Michigan State University College of Law, favre@law.msu.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.msu.edu/facpubs
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons at Michigan State University College of Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons at Michigan State University College of Law. For more
information, please contact domannbr@law.msu.edu.
Recommended Citation
David S. Favre, A Framework for Analysis of the Takings Issue, 1995 Det. C.L. Rev. 3 (1995).
HeinOnline -- 1995 Det. C.L. Rev. 3 1995
A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS OF THE 
"TAKINGS" ISSUE 
David S. Favre • 
A little bit of my background in this area, so you know where I 
came from, I went to law school at William and Mary beginning in 
1970, right after the first earth day, and I was interested in environ-
mental issues at that point in time. I got involved with the Chesa-
peake Bay Foundation and some other groups and was part of the 
drafting of the wetlands legislation for the Virginia legislature. As 
somebody helping to draft that legislation, the takings issue was a 
critical part of thinking about how to draft the legislation. My 
interest in this area started then, and, obviously, continued on with the 
environmentalist perspective. 
As a professor, teaching Property and Land Use Planning, the 
takings issue arose in another context, and that was in the zoning · 
context. Over the past decade I have to read all of the Supreme Court 
cases concerning this issue. What I would like to do this morning, 
first of all, is develop a broad conceptual framework that should act 
as a point of reference for the whole day. It should provide us a 
place to put all the different issues that are involved with the takings 
lSSUe. 
One of the things we have to recognize from the beginning when 
talking about takings is that there is no clear roadmap, nobody has a 
clear roadmap. There was a conference held this summer with 
national experts from all over the country, coming with all kinds of 
topics and the consensus was that takings is a muddle, and there is a 
lot of truth to that. Because if you try and get too specific about 
predicting outcomes for future cases, it just is not really feasible. 
However, I do think there is a framework and one that helps us 
understand the great majority of the cases or potential fact patterns 
that are involved. It is a fact that there is a gray area, there always 
has been a gray area in this area, and will continue to be a gray area, 
it is the nature of the beast. This issue is not like an IRS revenue 
ruling or a provision of the UCC, there is just no way any court is 
going to be able to nail it. I will show you why as we get further 
into it. I am also, to some degree, going to have to simplify in this 
overview some of the material, and I recognize that I am going to be 
leaving out a few of the finer points of the cases simply because to 
get into them causes more confusion than help. Also, I would like to 
* David Favre is Dean of the Detroit College of Law. He began teaching property 
law in 1977. 
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treat my session as a classroom session and urge the members of the 
audience to ask questions as I am going through it, because if each 
step is not clear it is not going to work and I need to make sure that 
everybody is with me as we go through. 
Well, what is a takings? First thing we do is look at the language 
of the Constitution, on page one of your outline of materials, which 
I really commend to your use as a very useful outline and quick 
source of reference to many of the cases that are involved. 1 This 
whole issue starts with the U.S. Constitution and an equivalent 
provision of the state constitution which says "nor shall private 
property be taken for public use without just compensation."2 This 
is the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. All amendments to 
the U.S. Constitution are set as limitations on government action to 
protect individuals from over intrusive government activity and it is 
relatively clear that at the time of the drafting of this amendment that 
the reference was to the titled property, literal titled property. The 
state, the king at the time, does not have the right, although the king 
in England use to take the right literally, to come in and move you 
off your piece of land and use the land. They decided that while the 
state should have the power to obtain title to land as is required by 
the public good, that when they do so, they must pay for it and they 
must pay the fair value for it. That is the beginning point of what 
this amendment means. It stood as that for a long, long time, 
approximately 120 to 150 years. The provision was triggered only by 
a taking of the title of a piece of private property. It was not until 
1922 in the Pennsylvania Coal case3 that the U.S. Supreme Court 
significantly expanded the reach of that amendment to deal with what 
we are now talking about today as reguiatory takings. An action 
wherein the government does not take the title, but imposes such 
limitations upon the use of the land that we say it is "as if' it is an 
equivalent of the taking of the title, and therefore compensation 
should be paid. 
Recognize that the takings analysis is a judicial activity. It is a 
check by the courts on the other two branches of government, the 
legislative and the executive branch. It is a determination as to the 
appropriateness of the action of the legislature or the executive branch 
by the judiciary. The only appeal to their decision is, of course, 
ultimately to the U.S. Supreme Court. Once the Supreme Court says 
I. See Outline in Appendix. 
2. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
3. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922). 
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"what is a taking and what is not a taking" that is it, we are stuck 
with it, unless you change the members of the court, in which case, 
of course, you sometimes can get a different outcome. 4 Over a 
period of time it has become clear that the takings limitation on state 
action apply to the federal and state local government, to the 
legislative activities of all levels of government, as well as to 
decisions by executives within the government, i.e., the Department 
of Interior, Environmental Protection Agency, state agencies, local 
zoning boards, or whoever exercises executive decision making 
power. The issuance of a § 401 water permit/ a state wetlands 
permit, local zoning variance, whatever it is, those are all executive 
activities and they are also subject to limitation of the Fifth Amend-
ment. 
Now when does it arise as an issue? And this is something that we 
do have to sort out, to understand exactly when you ought to look to 
the limitations of the Fifth Amendment as a constraint. The first 
requirement is that you must have property. Two primary categories 
of property are personal property and real property. The limitation of 
government action applies to personal property as well as real 
property. We do not hear too much about the personal property side 
of it because it really does not arise too often, but it can arise. There 
is a case that refers to eagle feathers. 6 The Endangered Species Ace 
was passed by the federal government. It made it illegal to sell eagle 
feathers, because eagles were listed as an endangered species and it 
was illegal to sell a species or a part or product of a species. There 
was a person who brought a suit saying that the legal restraint 
constituted a taking in that it took away the right to sell. The 
Supreme Court basically said "sorry about that," the public policy 
interest in preserving species is more important than private individual 
right to sell and basically waved it off and was not impressed with the 
takings claim. The government did not take the eagle feathers away 
from them, but the law clearly restrained considerably what could be 
done with those eagle feathers. You could not ship them interstate, 
you could not sell them. So it did limit the use of private property, 
and more recently, the Supreme Court reaffirmed that it has a blase 
attitude about protecting personal property. That is not the focal point 
4. Compare Pennsylvania Coal and Keystone . Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. 
DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987). 
5. 33 u.s.c. § § 1281, 1284, 1341, 1342 (1988) 
6. United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734 (1986). 
7. 16 u.s.c. §§ 1531-1544 (1988). 
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of our concern here today. Today we have a concern with real 
property. 
There are several examples of real property ownership to which the 
takings limitation might apply. The obvious one is full ownership, if 
you own land in full, in a fee simple, then government actions which 
limit the use of the land potentially are subject to the limitation. But 
even if you do not have full ownership, if you only have a partial 
ownership, a partial interest in real property, it may, nevertheless 
apply. A mineral interest is an example of a partial ownership. The 
mineral right holder of a piece of land does not own the full fee, only 
the right to exploit the mineral. But, nevertheless, that is a property 
right and as such is subject to takings limitation. You may also have, 
and here is where you start to push into a gray area, a contract right 
or a license from a government agency to make use of a public 
resource, at some point and in some circumstances, it will crystalize 
into being recognized as a property right, and once you say that word, 
then the Fifth Amendment applies to it. Normal contracts do not 
constitute property. That you have a contract with the government 
does not normally give you property right, but when you have certain 
contracts about real property, sometimes they do say that it can be 
considered a property right, and this can get very confusing. 
Often one of the areas that this comes up in is in water rights areas. 
Out West the issue of water rights is a very serious issue, worth lots 
of money and lots of lawyers litigate water right issues all the time. 
In Michigan we are under a different system and we do not tend to 
have the takings issue arising very often. 8 I would suggest to you 
that there are three major categories, or three different types of 
interference we will be talking about; ·interference with the title itself, 
interference with possession and interference by regulation. 
Interference with the title itself would normally arise under the 
category of eminent domain. Eminent domain is the process by 
which a state obtains, involuntarily, title to a piece of land owned by 
a private individual. I think one of our other speakers is going to 
8. Question from the audience: What if a developer has a contract to purchase 
land, and the local government changes the zoning, destroying the value of the land. Is the 
government action subject to the limitations of the Fifth Amendment? 
Answer: That may be fact specific, but I would think that you certainly have a 
shot at using the limitation where the agreement between the land owner and the 
developer clearly gives that person a right to purchas_e the property, where there are 
words like an option to purchase, or something else like that Where there is an 
interest in land created by that contract, then I think the developer has a shot at it, 
but you would have to see the specific language involved in the contract 
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spend some time talking about this, so I will not spend a lot of time 
on it. What is relatively clear is that it is a power the state has, and 
that the State may exercise that power within certain limitations. But 
that is not regulatory takings, that is not what most of the debate is 
about these days. 
Next we have the issue of possession. This is quite important. 
One of the premier characteristics of real property as defined in the 
United States, in our capitalist system, is the right to exclude others. 
If you have full ownership of land, you have the right to exclude 
others. And that is one of the things that the court protects. They 
recognize that if you do not have the right to exclude others, then you 
may not functionally have title to the land. If you have title, but are 
not able to keep other people off of it, you have lost one of the 
premier rights of land ownership. 
The third category is regulation. In reading all the cases and 
preparing for today, I have decided that, as many lawyers as there are, 
there may be as many different ways of breaking this down, but I 
have come up with just two categories that I think most of the fact 
patterns fit. These categories allow us to understand some of the 
differences in why things come out the way they do. The first 
category is what I call extractions, extractions before development. 
An extraction before development occurs when somebody goes into 
a local zoning board and says "I would like to develop this land and 
I want to put four houses on it" and the local zoning board says 
"alright you can do that if you pay us for putting in the sewer, and if 
you set back your house fifteen feet." They may then list the 8,000 
other things that a developer has to do before the building permit is 
signed. Those are extractions, promises. Some of them are fairly 
simple and straightforward, but they can get complicated. Sometimes 
the extractions are money, sometimes the extractions are property 
itself. Some local governments have said, for example, that if the 
developer wants to put in a subdivision, they must donate 1 0% of 
their land to the city to be set aside as parks within the subdivision. 
Well that is an extraction, they have taken the land as quid pro quo 
for getting the permit to develop. 
The second major category of regulation is prohibitions, prohibi-
tions of development that are imposed for purposes of protecting 
some natural resource. The resource may be a wetlands, may be a 
watershed, may be a flood plain, may be sand dunes, it could be a 
wide assortment of natural resources that government simply does not 
want the individual to develop at all, and therefore basically imposes 
a prohibition. 
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Let me give you a couple of hypotheticals and see if we can figure 
out where they would fit within this grid. What if the Department of 
Natural Resources ("DNR") passes a regulation that says no one may 
hunt ducks within 100 yards of the Red River? We have a property 
owner, Mr. X who owns land on the Red River, he claims that the 
regulation constitutes unlawful taking of his property right to hunt 
ducks. What do we think? Does it fit in here? Well, as a first 
inquiry, is it a government action that is at question? Yes. The 
action is subject to the Fifth Amendment limitation. Is property 
involved? No, because what is it being interfered with? The claim 
is the right to hunt. Is the right to hunt a property right? The vast 
majority of cases say no, the right to hunt is not a property right, it 
is a privilege to be allowed or disallowed by the state. Is the right to 
hunt a specifically recognized attribute of ownership of land? And 
again the answer is no. So if it is not a property right you stop at 
that point, there is nothing else to do. You may attack the decision 
based on other legal basis, you can say it is arbitrary or capricious, 
you can say it is without lawful purposes, or other things, but you 
will not be able to use the Fifth Amendment as the process to attack. 
State control of hunting has to do with the long term existence of 
what is called the state ownership doctrine which has to do with the 
right of the state to control access to wildlife. This doctrine has been 
in existence for such a long period of time that it simply has never 
been a right of the individual control of wildlife, the state has always 
retained that right. And the right to hunt is simply a way to get to 
those animals which are controlled by states, not by local property 
owners. It is somewhat unique, but it is an assertion you see in a 
number of cases and the courts have dealt with it and said no. 
Second hypothetical, DNR again, in order to protect ducks on the 
Red River adopts a regulation that says there will be no development 
within 100 yards of the river, a protected habitat. Is the Fifth 
Amendment able to act as a limitation on that? It is real property; we 
are dealing with a full owner; it is a regulation that is a prohibition; 
and it is going to be subject to Fifth Amendment analysis. The right 
to develop is one within the bundles of ownership rights, a right that 
is recognized by all the courts. Now at the moment I do not want to 
suggest the outcome, we will come back to that, but clearly this 
would be subject to Fifth Amendment analysis. 
What if they passed a regulation, this would likely be done by local 
government rather than the DNR, but it is a regulation that says "all 
persons wishing to develop land on the Red River must donate an 
easement for public use· of the land within 100 yards of the shore-
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line." What is the property right that is that issue? The right to 
exclude others. So again, you have real property, full ownership, 
state regulation, but it is an extraction for development rather than a 
prohibition. It also may be an interference with the right to develop 
as well, but it clearly is an interference with the right to exclude 
others. 
How is the court going to decide these conflicts? Where do you 
draw the line? How much is too much? This is where all the 
lawyers get into trouble in trying to articulate a "one rule covers all" 
fact pattern. It just simply does not exist. I would suggest to you 
that the general parameter of how a court approaches this issue is: 
what is fair? That is a very big statement, but I think that is really 
what is operating in the back of the mind of the judges. Now, this is 
fair in a very complex context - we will be talking about that context 
in just a minute - but, when you look at the courts and you see the 
results, it often comes down to them saying "yes, that seems right, the 
outcome seems fair." They use all sorts of words and rules to get 
there, but focus on what is the outcome. Is an owner allowed to 
proceed? Or is an owner not allowed to proceed? I would also 
suggest that in this area, in particular, we are subject to the judicial 
outlook of the individual judges. What is fair? One context in which 
fairness is determined, is the mind of the judge. How does that 
person think about "fair"? How do they weigh various factors? How 
much do they believe in judicial restraint? How much do they 
believe in an activist government? How much do they think public 
policy for protection of the environment is a very strong versus a 
weak point of view? Which judges are on the Supreme Court will 
make a difference in the outcome of some of these cases. The last 
three or four cases before the Supreme Court have been close five to 
four decisions. Change one judge and you have a different result. 
That is why we cannot be too focused on the minutia of these cases, 
I think, because it may all be different in two or three years. I do 
think we need to understand the boarder context as to what is an 
appropriate activity for local and state government. 
The other thing I would suggest to you is that the cases are very 
fact specific. The courts write their opinions dealing very much with 
the case directly before them, and if you do not have one that is real 
close to the same facts, you get into the gray area very quickly. The 
courts spend a lot of time looking at the facts in each case. It is not 
a matter of public policy or "the rule should be," it is what happened 
right here: what did the government really say, what did the private 
party want, what is the degree of interference, what is the evaluation 
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of the property before and after the activity? All sorts of very strong 
details are involved. 
From a fairly old Supreme Court case comes the proposition that 
we must allow for the petty larceny of the state. It is understood that 
when you adopt any regulation it infringes somewhat on the freedom 
of the individual that owns that property. For example, there might 
be a requirement that all buildings have fire extinguishers. That is a 
regulation, it is a limitation, it means you have to spend money, you 
have to put it somewhere you may have wanted to put something else. 
That is a petty larceny, it is a very small interference given the 
overriding public concerns about fires, I think everyone would agree 
this is not an inappropriate regulation, but it is a regulation that 
interferes. One of the broad policy questions in this area is: when 
should private parties bear the cost of the regulatory burden? When 
should the public bear the cost? If the public is to bear the burden it 
is usually through the paying of taxes. We want a particular public 
policy outcome, and the question is how do we reach that goal? The 
goal might be safety from fire. Well, you can either make the private 
parties buy the fire extinguishers, or you could have the public pay 
for the fire extinguishers and then give them to the private parties. 
You can do it either way. For the most part, we do not have the 
public buying the fire extinguisher and then giving it to the private 
party, we simply make the private party get their own. We have 
decided we do not have to have the public pay for it. It gets back to 
what is fair and what is appropriate. 
What about a rather benign thing as we now view it, but when you 
look at it, is really substantial. You want to put in a house or a new 
development on a piece of land and you go in to the city and they say 
"that is fine, but you have to put in a sidewalk in front of your 
house," a sidewalk is a substantial interference, it means you cannot 
develop that part of the land, you have to spend the money to put in 
the cement and this invites the public to walk on it. So you have an 
interference with possession. But I think most of us accept that that 
seems like a reasonable thing for a locality to do. We like sidewalks, 
we do not like to walk in the street. We do not like to walk in the 
niud and everybody gives up a little bit in a subdivision to receive the 
public benefit that derives from sidewalks. But it is an interference 
with property rights, but not an unfair one. Most people and judges 
would not find it to be an illegal "takings." 
Now what do we do about developing some rules for helping 
decide when the state has gone too far? What test has the Supreme 
Court adopted to help sort the appropriate from inappropriate action? 
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As for our first category, an interference with title, there is no 
discussion, if title is taken, payment must be had. 
There is a simple rule dealing with the second category, interfer-
ence with possession. The Supreme Court had a case a couple of 
years ago regarding possession called Loretto v. Teleprompter 
Manhatten CATV Corp.,9 which clarified the court's position, and I 
think it remains a pretty firm rule. I do not think we will see much 
variation under the second category. The rule is a per se rule. That 
means if there is a determination by the court, that a particular 
activity results in allowing either the government or third parties to 
have physical access to private land, it is a Fifth Amendment violation 
for which compensation must be paid. In that particular case the state 
law allowed cable company owners to come upon the building of 
landlords and place their boxes and their connections, on the roofs of 
these buildings without the permission of the land owners. The 
impact of the rule was diminished when on remand of the case the 
value of the taking or interference was found to be to one dollar per 
property. 10 
For the third category of extractions and extracting development 
permits, under the most recent Supreme Court case in the area, which 
is Dolan v. City of Tigard, 11 we now say that there is a two part test. 
In the first part, to justify the extraction there must be a showing by 
the government that there is an appropriate nexus between the burdens 
of land development and the requirement that the city is imposing, or 
the government agency is imposing. The nexus between the burden 
of development and the requirement of the city12 - what does that 
mean? Well, let us say, for example, you want to develop a grocery 
store on a piece of land. But one of the requirements for you to get 
the appropriate building permit was that you had to contribute one 
percent of the value of the land towards the building of schools. The 
building of schools is clearly an appropriate good public purpose, but 
is there an appropriate nexus between that extraction of money for 
public schools and the development? The answer is no. Grocery 
stores do not have anything to do with increasing the demand for 
educational needs. If the extraction was applied to a developer of 
townhouses, then there would be that nexus, you are creating places 
9. 458 U.S. 419 (1982). 
I 0. Loretto, 458 U.S. 419. 
II. 114 S. Ct. 2309 (1994). 
12. Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2316-18. See generally Brenda Quick, Dolan v. City of 
Tigard: The Case That Nobody Won, 1995 DET. C.L. REV. 79. 
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where people are going to live and that is going to create an increase 
in the number of children, therefore, you might argue that the city 
needs some help in developing their educational facilities. The issue 
of nexus is discussed considerably in the Nollan 13 case. 
In the Dolan case, the most recent one, the Court created the next 
step of the analysis and said that assuming that nexus exists there 
must be a reasonable relationship between the public concern and 
what is extracted. For example, in that case there was an expansion 
of a hardware store, a fairly substantial expansion, and it was such an 
expansion that the city expected increased traffic to go to the store. 
Officials were concerned about the impact of increased traffic, which 
is an appropriate public concern. As a result, they requested there be 
a bike path put in the adjacent flood plain. The court did not find 
that there was a reasonable relationship between the concern and what 
was imposed upon them, it went too far. It looked like the city was 
trying to get something and that they did not want to pay for it. The 
city wanted to get an extraction of the owners right of possession that 
they ought to pay for with public funds. The city has a right to put 
a bike path down a flood plain if it wants to, it is probably a public 
good that would be justified, but the city ought to pay for it said the 
Supreme Court. 
Next category, protections and prohibitions. This does get fuzzy 
here. The Supreme Court has said that the public has a right, or the 
government has a right, to prohibit nuisance activities, to prohibit 
destruction activities. Almost any regulation, however, can be cast in 
terms of preventing a particular harm. There is great difficulty in 
knowing how much harm you have to be talking about to know when 
the Fifth Amendment has to be considered. This is when it gets 
particularly fact specific, as to the courts, and the difficulty in 
predicting what is going to happen. The classic case here is wetlands 
protection statutes. You cannot have development and protection of 
wetlands co-exist. You can have one or the other. The nature of 
wetlands are such that they have to remain with their physical 
integrity or they are not wetlands. Is the destruction of wetlands a 
nuisance activity? Let me give you an example of what has been 
accepted as an appropriate regulation. A very old Supreme Court 
case14 discusses a regulation that the city of Los Angeles imposed on 
property owners that said you could not put a brick factory in the 
middle of the city. This was done because the making of bricks 
13. Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987). 
14. Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915). 
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created air pollution so as to constitute a public nuisance. The Court 
said this regulation was acceptable, and cities could prohibit the use 
of that land to prevent the nuisance. The Supreme Court case that 
created the takings was the Pennsylvania Coal case, written by Justice 
Holmes. Here the state said coal owners may not take out coal if it 
is under a private dwelling even if you have the full property right to 
do so. That was a regulation to protect houses from falling into 
holes, but the court in that case found that the prohibition went too 
far, that it interfered with the ownership of the coal owner's rights. 
Justice Brandis has a marvelous dissent which recharacterized the 
same facts the majority had, so that, the actions of the state were 
considered lawful. The Pennsylvania Coal case discussed earlier is 
a relatively short case and I commend it to your reading. Justice 
Holmes and Justice Brandis are two of the most articulate Supreme 
Court justices we have had in this century and their different attitudes 
set out the dilemma we are still enmeshed in today about how you 
decide what is fair. Justice Brandis did not think the regulation was 
unfair and found that it was an appropriate exercise of the police 
power. Justice Holmes did not agree. 15 It was a close case obvious-
ly, another close decision. It would seem in today's world the mind 
set of the judiciary is predisposed to think that a public good is being 
obtained with the protection of natural resources. 
The idea of protecting wetlands or protecting sand dunes, protecting 
interfaces between land and water, gives a presumption of public 
good, but it still can go too far. So we go back to our hypothetical 
where you own land on the Red River, but may you develop the 
wetlands? Most recent state supreme court cases have held that the 
state probably can put that limitation in effect. Let me suggest to you 
the normal fact pattern which has occurred, that is the wetlands 
owned are a percentage of the full ownership of the piece of land. So 
when the courts go to look at the land, they say "what is the degree 
of interference?" If you were allowed to develop 80% of your land, 
but you cannot develop 20%, then it is much harder for the owner to 
say that there has been a takings. The Supreme Court has said that 
if the. value of the land basically goes to economic zero, you do have 
a violation. Ev:erybody agrees on that. One of the key phrases is 
"when all reasonably backed investment expectations are eliminated, 
you have a takings." You cannot just say "property value per se." 
If you were fooled when you bought the property, and a reasonable 
15. PennsylvaniaCoal, 260 U.S. at 393. 
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business person would have understood that the land was not 
developable under existing law and you paid more than scrub value 
for the land, you do not have a reasonably backed investment 
expectation. But when you have an elimination of land value down 
to zero, then the court is willing to say that you have incurred a 
regulatory takings. 
There are some cases like this but these seem to have occurred 
primarily in Florida where there are huge wetlands, thousands of acres 
of wetlands. A developer comes in and buys 1 00 acres of wetlands 
and then cannot get a permit to develop them. There the takings is 
entire. There is nothing they can do with that land whatsoever, and 
that is a takings. If they file in a court of claims in a federal court, 
assuming that you are talking about a federal water permit that is 
involved, then you will be able to receive, when you turn the deed 
over, the value of that land at the time of the takings. 
These tests are useful primarily for people who have bought land 
before new regulations or new laws are passed. At this point in time, 
if you buy 1 00 acres of mangrove swanip, you are a fool if you think 
you are going to put up a new housing development. It is simply not 
a reasonable expectation to be able to do that given the state of the 
law. So it is to protect people who would be buying a burden if they 
were not aware at the time they bought the land. 16 
If a track of land can not be commercially developed, but is a place 
to do birdwatching, does it not still have value? Although environ-
mentalists would love to say that birdwatching ought to give land 
high value, and if we limit a landowner to just birdwatching, they 
should be pleased. But I think the reality of the capitalist system is 
that this activity is not going to give value to land. Where that does 
come into play is when you have less than 100% interference. In 
other words, you can impose limitations that may reduce the value of 
the land 50% or 70%. Then what do you do? How does the court 
look at a mixed reduction, a less than full reduction? And that is 
where the courts get into what I refer to as the balancing test. The 
16. Question from the audience: If you bought a track of land with one idea; to farm 
it for example, but later, before a new zoning code was adopted, decided to commercially 
develop the track, would this be interference with "reasonably backed investment expecta-
tions? · 
Answer: Yes, I think you could change your expectations up until that time, you 
cannot change it when the law you are attacking is implemented, it is too late to 
say "I meant to do this." But if you have owned land for twenty to thirty years, 
you certainly can evolve your expectation over a period of time, but once a law 
becomes into effect, you cannot, after that, have new expectations. 
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balancing test looks at public benefit and private harm. Public benefit 
can be the protection of ecological interest. Clearly this is an 
accepted idea within the judicial system, that ecological protection has 
value. And so if the public seeks to promote that through adoption 
of regulations, it is seeking to promote a value. 
One area of regulation, which has been used in the Detroit area 
which I think is fascinating and takes us right to the edge of whether 
or not it is lawful or not lawful, is city regulations that deal with the 
protection of trees, individual trees on lots. The regulations are trying 
to promote saving old trees by saying you cannot build a house unless 
you get a permit and show how you are going to minimize the 
destruction of trees. One ordinance did not allow you to cut down 
any trees. The public benefit there is not quite as strong as protection 
of wetlands which is a known ecological area of high impact and high 
need to protect, whereas with trees on a residential lot it is a little bit 
harder to identify how strong is the public interest. So it seems to me 
that you can get quicker to finding that there is an unlawful taking or 
an inappropriate regulation of activity} 7 
Let us go back to the regulation which limited development within 
100 yards of the river. Now presume we have a track of land with 
30% within the restricted area. How would you think the court would 
go about looking at that? Courts do allow diminuation of value, if it 
reaches zero you know you have gone too far. How far can the value 
be diminished before it is an illegal takings? Each fact seems to be 
a little different. If they froze the access to land, said you could not 
walk on your land, then you have a takings, because clearly the right 
to posses would mean the right to go upon and use. So government 
can talk about a development restriction, but it cannot freeze you off 
your own land for access purposes. What is the value of the 
regulation? We were focusing at first on the degree of harm, and that 
is important, and that is a factual determination of how much 
interference. What was the percent reduction in value? But you also 
have to look at what is being protected by the regulation. Does this 
100 yard restriction make sense? Why 100 yards? Is that really 
17. Thomas Nord, Court Says Tree Law's Too Vague, DET. NEWS, Feb. 27, 1995, at · 
lB. The Michigan Court of Appeals upheld a lower court ruling that had held a 1989 West 
Bloomfield ordinance, aimed at preserving woodlands, unconstitutional. The law had been 
established to protect woodlands and to restrict efforts to clear them. The law was challenged 
when a business man removed 30 trees from a 24 acre tract of land designated as protected 
woodlands. The West Bloomfield township board will now have to decide whether to appeal 
the decision to the Michigan Supreme Court. /d. 
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necessary or appropriate? What if this is a pile of dredge material, 
totally useless ecologically? Does it make any sense to prohibit the 
development of that? Not really. In fact, you might think it a public 
good in promoting its development. Again, you have to be fairly fact 
specific and you do need to look at both components when you do a 
balancing test. If the ordinance adopted did not allow for exceptions 
to the permits, for variances, then the ordinance could be in trouble. 
One of the clues for a troubled ordinance is when there is a total 
prohibition with no variance procedures allowed. If you limit 
development within 100 yards of the Red River for eighteen miles up 
and down the river and there is no way to accommodate unusual fact 
patterns in the ordinance, then I think you have an attackable 
ordinance. 
The problem of small losses adding up to big losses is exactly what 
the wetlands awareness was about in the 1960's and 1970's. You can 
look at the early cases and you can see that some judges just did not 
understand it, did not accept it and therefore the state lost. The 
ordinances or laws were struck down. It is the nature of our judicial 
system, the courts are the final arbitrars here. The state has to 
convince the judges of the public values, that is what an attorney has 
to understand from the beginning. If this is an unusual public good 
that is being promoted, that has not been generally accepted by 
society, then you are going to have a special problem of educating the 
judge. That is the burden plaintiff has, I do not think there is any 
way around it. Now the idea that stopping the incremental loss of 
wetlands, is a public good, is broadly accepted. Even very conserva-
tive judges, who might otherwise be protective of private property 
rights, find that as a public good. Now how much weight they give 
to it may be something else, but the concept is now in the broader 
community. If there is a very diffuse interest, how much can you 
expect the individual to bear the burden of that? What is fair? In our 
system of capitalism, we do have to recognize the premises. Property 
ownership brings with it the right to utilize that property and 
ecological concerns are overlays in limitations on that but they have 
to be specifically identified and promoted. You cannot just generally 
say "we do not want to change the ecology of Michigan, therefore we 
are not going to develop anymore," that is just not going to work, so 
there is no clear answer to the dilemma, it is a matter of public 
policy. 
I hope that these thoughts have provided some useful organization 
of what is a complex topic. 
